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INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of cognitive theory in learning,
there has been a somewhat parallel movement among motiva
tion theorists.

The "cogniti ve 11 theori-sts presume that

man is rational and able to organize his thoughts, atti
tudes, beliefs, and experiences in meaningful ways.

Heider

believes organisms strive to achieve "balanced states, 11
and Newcomb has identified a "strain toward symmetry" in
man's behavior (Zajonc, 1960).

Lecky (1961, p.2) states

that "motivation theory is incomplete without recognizing
that the prime need of an organism is to maintain its men
tal organization as a unified whole. 11

Festinger' s "cogni

tive dissonance" theory (Festinger, 1957) appears to express
the same thought that man will be most comfortable and
satisfied when all his thoughts, attitudes, and beliefs are
consistent with each other.
Vroom's (1964) more recent cognitive model of motiva
tion similarly relies on man's desire for consistency.
Vroom hypothesized that a person is most motivated to do
(a) those things he most prefers to do, or those activities
whose outcomes he belieyes to be pleasurable and he there
fore assigns a positive valence, and (b) that which he
sees as having the highest probability of success, or what
he believes he will be able to attain (called

1

1

expectancy 11 ).

Vroom's valence X expectancy motivation theory sees man as
1

2

both rational and consistent.
Other theorists have expanded upon Vorrm's theory.
Particular attention has been given to· the "expectancy"
portion of Vroom 1 s theory.

Kaufman (1963) included one's

self-concept within the theory of cognitive balance.

If

an individual believes that he possesses an attribute nec
essary for his performance, he will tend to expect that he
will perform well, and he will try to see that his expec
tation of his performance is accurate.

If, on the other

hand, he fails, a state of imbalance will exist, and he
will either change his belief in his own attributes or
change his belief that the attribute is critical to per
formance.
Korman (1967a) is another theorist who has enlarged
upon Vroom 1 s valence X expectancy model.

Broadly, Korman

suggests that a person's expectations are influenced by his
self-esteem.
11

In.Korman's terms, self-esteem acts as a

moderator variable" on an individual I s behavior (Korman,

1966).

Korman (1967b) relies heavily on earlier theor ists

to make a number of theoretical assumptions.

First, he

has assumed that individuals will find satisfying those
circumstances which maximize their sense of cognitive bal
ance.

The second assumption is that individuals will strive

to attain

11

balance" situations.

Third, Korman assumes

that social norms prescribe that individuals should seek
and perform well on tasks and situations they find satis-

3
fying.

The last of Korman's assumptions defines self

esteem as " • . • the extent to which he sees himself as a
competent, personal, need-fulfilling individual."

(Korman,

1968, p. 485).
For all its similarity to earlier.motivation theories,
Korman has carefully delineated the differences found in
his new theory from earlier theories (Korman, 1968).

First

and perhaps most important, Korman's theory emphasizes self
esteem and self-perception es part of the cognitive system
of an individual, and suggests causes of variations in
one's self-perception, such as mood or particular experi
ences.

Second, Korman's theory is capable of explaining

self-esteem conceptions on the basis of either past rein
forcement history (experience) or more immediate causes,
such as certain social or interpersonal influences.

Third,

it attempts to make predictions on three dependent variables
of particular relevance to industrial psychology:

work

performance, work choice, and work satisfaction, all within
the same theoretical framework.
Korman's specific hypothesis is that

11

all other things

being equal, individuals will engage in and find satisfying
those behavioral roles which will maximize their sense of
cognitive balance or consistency. 11

(Korman ., 1970, p.32).

Korman has derived two corrollaries implied by this major
hypothesis:
1) Individuals will tend to perform on a task
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in a manner that is consistent with, or in balance
with, their self-esteem concept on a given task.
If a person has a great deal of self-esteem rela
tive to a certain task, he will be motivated to
perform well on that task to maintain his cogni
tive balance.
2) Individuals tend to choose and find most satisfying
those task roles which are most consistent
with their self-esteem. If a person perceives
himself as a competent, achieving, need-satisfy
ing individual, he will choose and find most
satisfying ttose tasks which allow him to be in
balance with his self-esteem.
In Korman's conception, an individual with high self
esteem will perceive himself to be capable of performing
well on more difficult tasks, partially as a function
of his self-esteem.

The �ircularity of Korman's theory is

reversed in the case of the individual with low self-esteem.
The person with low self-esteem is more likely to accept
situations where his performance will not be adequate and
where he will actually not perform well, thereby maintain
ing his cognitive balance.

This in turn will lower his

self-esteem even further and lead him once again to choose
tasks where his performance will be inadequate (Korman,
1967a).
Korman has allowed for certain fluctuations in self
eateem.

Some people may have a relatively stable concept

of their self-esteem across all tasks and situations.
Other individuals' self-esteem may vary with the particular
task at hand.

Finally, and of particular relevance to the

present,paper, self-esteem may be influenced by the expec-
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tations that others have of us, as demonstrated and dis
cussed by Tannenbaum (1962).
The two manipulations under study in this paper have
been examined separately by Korman (1970).

Korman attempt

ed to manipulate self-perceived competence and determine
its relative effects on high and low sel f-esteem individ
uals.

He predicted that the higher the goals are set for

an individual, the higher the implied competence and the
better the performance (Korman, 1971), particularly for
high self-esteem individuals,

Perhaps one of the most

famous, thou gh controversial, studies dealing with self
perceived competence was made by Aronson and Carlsmith
(1962).

They predicted and substantiated the fact that

individuals who experience dissonance between their self
perceived competence can also influence performance.
Ziller (1969) has theorized that self-esteem mediates
social stimuli and responses:

people with high self-esteem

(HSE) are more insulated from evaluations and manipula
tions, while persons with low self-esteem (LSE) are mor e
easily influenced by any evaluations or manipulations
around them.

Not only can performance be affected by an

individual's self-perceived competence, but his self
perceived competence can also be manipulated, thereby
changing his performance (Diggory, 1966).

Korman has pre

dicted and obtained the result that high self-esteem (HSE)
people perform better than low self-esteem (LSE) persons
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on the same task (Korman, 1970).
The second manipulation made by Korman (1970) in
volved the delay of feedback of performance on a given
task.

Ostensibly, individuals with low self-esteem (LSE)

who were told they were not performing well would not
modify their performance.

Persons with high self-esteem

(HSE),. however, would change their behavior if they were
told they were not performing well.

Specific�lly, feed

back was immediate when the Brick Uses Test was used as
the dependent variable because Ss could see their degree
of success as they went along.

There was·no feedback given

when the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal served
as the dependent variable because Ss were never told the
correct responses (Korman, 1970).

Korman predicted that

the high sel f-esteem (HSE) persons would perform better
than the low self-esteem (LSE) people when both were given
feedback on their performance.

Results obtained by Korman

(1970) give reasonable support to the predictions.
Korman's two studies that have dealt with self-per
ceived competence and delay of feedback (Korman, 1968;
1970) have used either the Brick Uses Test or the Infer
ences Subtest of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Appraisal.

No particular explanation was given for using

these tests, other than they are !'creativity" type tests
(Korman, 1970).

The author of the present study has recog

nized that in order for Korman's results to be more widely
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acceptable and generalizable, a broader range of

11

crea-

tivity" tests should be employed as dependent variables.
It is also a notion of this author that performance on
such tests might be modified not only by self-esteem, but
by a more basic attribute, such as "intelligence," as well.
The purpose of the present study is (1) to replicate
the results of Korman's (1970) previous study, (2) to in
vestigate the interaction effects between self-esteem,
delay of feedback, and self-perceived competence, and

(3) to determine whether the results of Korman's (1970)

study are generalizable to dependent variables other than
those employed by Korman.

METHOD
The subjects for this study were 33 Western Michigan
University students enrolled in the course "Psychological
Measurement," offered by the Psychology Department.

The

class was moderately heterogeneous wi th respect to academic
major areas.

Approximately half of the students were psy

chology majors, and the other half was composed of educa
tion and multifarious other major areas.
subjects were juniors and seniors.

The majority of

Virtually all Ss had

little, if any previous experience as subjects in any type
of psychological experiment.
A number of separate studies were planned.

First,

a 2 X 2 X 3 analysis of variance design, with the indepen
dent variables self-esteem, self-perceived competence, and
delay of feedback was devised.

The dependent variable for

this design was the Inferences subtest of the Watson-Glaser
Critical Thinking Appraisal (Form YM), used previously by
Korman (1970).

The second study was a 2 X 2 design, with

self-esteem and self-perceived competence as the indepen
dent variables.

For this design, the Match Problems test

was chosen because (a) it could be scored objectively, and
(b) statistically, it was least related, of a number of
11

creativity 11 tests, to the Brick Uses test, also used pre

viously by Korman (1970) (Cline, et. al., 1962; Cline,
et. al., 1963).

The only reason that the feedback
8
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variable was not administered with this design using the
Match Problems test as the dependent variable was due to
a lack of time;

the answers to this t�st ire rather com

plex and would have required Ss to give more than a rapid
glance to obtain feedback.

The third _investigation was

intended to determine the relative contributions of self
esteem and "intelligence" to the two dependent measures,
the Watson-Glaser and the Match Problems test.

However,

it was later decided that due to a small N, this analysis
would be questionable.
The three studies were carried out in rapid succes
sion.

All 33 Ss had finished half the class period.

The

course instructor prefaced his introduction of the experi
menter by explaining to the Ss that they had studied about
tests all semester;

now they were going to have some

experience actually taking tests.

The E was then intro

duced, who in turn introduced her two assistants.

All

three Es were female, to avoid experimental bias.

The

entire group of Ss were asked to complete Ghiselli's Self
Description Inventory (1971), the measure of self-esteem.
Immediately following completion of the Inventory, all Ss
were given the Wonderl ic Pe,rsonnel Test (Form D).
Wonderlic served as the measure of ''intelligence. 11
Ss were then randomly divided into three groups.

The
The
Each of

the three groups of Ss were then assigned to a separate
room and E.

Two Ss were lost in transit.
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The Es distributed both tests, the Match Problems
and the Watson-Glaser, in a packet, to all Ss.

Ss were

asked to read the "purpose of tests" explanation attached
to each pa±r of tests.

This statement of purpose served

as the independent variable self-perceived competence and
was drawn directly from an earlier study by Korman (1968).
The statement which served as the low level of the self
perceived competence variable read:
This is the first time these two tests ( 1 'Ma tch
Problems 11 and "Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Appraisal") have been used as part of a normative
aptitude study at Western Michigan University.
Previously, these tests have been administered
at Harvard University. Harvard is highly selec
tive in its admission policies: an individual
in the 90th percent le here at Western would only
be in the 50th percentile at Harvard. Similarly,
a student in only the 50th percentile at Harvard
would be in the 90th percentile here at astern.
From the results of these tests from Harvard, we
know what the average levels of performance are.
Now we are moving these tests into more 11 mass 11
institutions like Western where students-are of a
much wider range in quality and where the average
student at estern is considerably below the
Harvard student in ability.
e expect to get
lower levels of performance here�
The opposite approach was taken for the high level of
the self-perceived competence varia::ile.

Ss were told they

would be compared with junior and community colleges whose
admission policies were much less sel�ctive than at Western.
The same relative percentiles were used:

a student at the

90th percentile at a junior college would only be at the
50th percentile at Western.

Ss were told

get higher levels of performance here. 11

11

we expect to

11

Half of the Ss in each of the three groups, or five
or six Ss per group, were given the high self-perceived
competence statement, and the other half, or the remaining
five or six in each group, received the low self-perceived
competence statement.

Both statements occupied approxi

mately the same number of lines of type, Ss were not
allowed to talk among themselves at any time during the
experiment, and Ss were given no opportunity to ask
questions about the "purpose of tests" statements.
soon as all Ss f.i nished reading their

11

As

purpose of tests 11

statement, each E immediately read the directions fo r the
Match Problems test.

There does not seem to be any reason

to believe Ss did not remain naive about the existence
of two different statements.
As soon as each group of Ss completed the Match
Problems test (a total of 31 Ss), they were asked to read
the statement attached to the second test, the Watson-Glaser
Critical Thinking Appraisal.

This second statement was

basically a reminder of the purpose of the tests.

For

example:
Remember the purpose of these tests is to compare
aptitude norms of Harvard students with a "mass"
institution such as Western. An indivi dual in the
90th percentile at Western would only be in the
50th percentile at Harvard. We expect to get lower
levels of performance here .
A similar restatement for high self-perceived competence
Ss was also given.

Great care was taken by E to insure
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that the main statement of purpose and the reminder were
either both directed to high self-perceived competence,
or both to low self-perceived competence.

Again, Ss were

not allowed to talk among themselves and Ss were not given
the opportunity to ask questions.

Up ·to this point, the

procedure for all three groups of Ss was identical.
When the Ss were finished reading the restatement of
the "purpose of the tests," Es read aloud the instructions
to the Inferences Subtest of th� Watson-Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisal.

One E read only the instructions for

the Inferences Subtest, then let the Ss take the test as
it is normally given.

One of the remaining Es added these

instructions, which served as the delay of feedback variable:
When you finish the first ten answers, raise your
hand and I will give you a sheet that has the first
ten correct answers on it. Compare your answers
with the answers on this sheet. Do not change
any of your answers. Continue working on the test.
When you have completed the next ten answers, raise
your hand again and I will give you a sheet which
has the next ten correct answers on it. Again,
compare your answers with this sheet, but do not
change any of your answers.
The final E.read these same instructions, but distributed
the answer sheets after every five answers.

Summarizing,

one group of Ss received no feedback on their answers to
the Watson-Glaser, one group received feedback after every
ten answers, and the remaining group received feedback after
every five answers.

It should be noted that all Ss who

were given feedback were given accurate feedback for all
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twenty answers to the Inferences Subtest of the Watson
Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal.

All Ss proceeded at

their own pace and received a mimeographed strip of paper
with the correct answers on it whenever they raised their
hands.

Ss were instructed to leave the. room as soon as

they finished the Watson-Glaser test.

Twenty-nine Ss

completed this test.
The entire set o f experiments too� approximately an
hour and a half, and ended at the same time the regular
course was scheduled to end.

RESULTS
A three-way analysis of variance was employed in
the analysis of the data obtained using the Inferences
Subtest of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisalo
The purpose of this statistical test was to determine the
existence of any main effects or interactions among the
variables self-esteem, delay of feedback, and self-per
ceived competence.

Because there was an unequal n per

cell, an unweighted means analysis was used to compute the
F values (Kirk, 1968).

As shown in Table I , all main and

in teraction results were non-significant, using alpha = .05
(see Table II for cell, row, and column means).
Similarly, a two-way analysis of variance was performed,
using t he scores obtained from the Match Problems Test, to
determine whether the results of Korman's (1970) work
were gener alizabl� to other creativi ty type tests.

This

design also required use of the unweighted means analysi
_ s.
Results given in Table II again show al l results were non
significant at alpha=.05.

See Table IV for cell, row, an d

column means for this analysis.
Due to the relatively small N, any sta tisti cal analyses
involvin g a correlation-type analysis were omitted.
fore, the analyses planned for the
were not performed.

14

11

There

intelligence 11 scores

TABLE I
Analysis of Variance: Watso.n-Glaser
as Dependent Variable (N::29)
Source
Self-Esteem (A)
Delay of Feedback ( B)
Self-Perceived
Competence (C)
AX B
AX C
BX C
AX BX C
W• cell

ss

df

F

MS

.014

054

1

2

· 11. 82

.329

13.51

1

13.51

.364

1

29.58

.796

2

17.65

-23.64
28.24

2

44.89

2

1337.73

36

29.58

35.31

.54

14.12

22 .45

37.07

.381

.606

-476

TABLE II

Cell, Row, and Column Means: WatsonGlaser BS Dependent Variable

HSE
x=12.o
s.d. = 2.19
LSE
x=10.06
s.d. = J.O

LSPC-ir

Delay of Feedback
0
- 5
X•l3.5
x= 12.o
s.d. = 1.5
s.d. = 2.0

HSPC-lHr

X=1i.5
s.d. = 0.5

x:13.33
s.d. = 2.05

10
X:12.0
s.d. = 1.0
x:9.0
s.d. = 1.0

LSPC-:i.

x = 10.75
s.d. = 2.28

X =l4.0
s.d.•l.O

s.d.= l.7

HSPC-iH,

X = 8aO
s.d.= 4.0

x = 12.o
s.d. = 1.0

s.d.-= 0.94

X: = 10.6
s.d. = 2.99

X:13.2
s. d.= L 79

x:9. 2
s.d. = 1.99

X=B.33

X=B.33

.,HrHSPC (High- Self
-t,LSPC (Low Self-Perceived
Perceived Competence)
Competence)
X = 10.4
X = 11.4
s.d.•2.95
s.d. = 2.67
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TABLE III
Analysis of Variance: Match Problems
as Dependent Variable (N=31)
Source
Self-Esteem (A)
Self-Perceived
Competence (B)
AX B
W•cell

ss

df

MS

1

25.33

1.57

13.35

1

13.35

.83

434.86

27

16.11

25.33
22.65

17

1

22065

F

1.407

TABLE IV

Cell, Row, and Column Means: Match Problems
as Dependent Variable
LSPC�i-

HSE
X=8.o
s.d. = 4.65

LSE
X•9.0
s.d.= 3.5

HSPC-lH;-

x=12.14
s.d. = 3.91

s.d.:2.87

x=1.5

X:8.3
s.d. = 3.41

X=l0.05
s.d.:4.95

�$-LSPC is Low Self-Perceived Competence
J.B}HSPC is High Self-Perceived Competence
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X:8. 56
s.d.•4.21
X=9.67
s.d.= 4.24

DISCUSSION
The results obtained in the present paper demonstrated
that the variables self-esteem, feedback, and self-per
ceived competence failed to show a statistically significant
effect on the,performance of college students on creativity
type tasks.

These results are not in agreement with those

found previously by Korman (1970).

In his 1970 study Korman

found that (a) although the effects of self-perceived com
petence were not statistically evaluated, high self-esteem
(HSE) Ss performed significantly better than did low self
esteem (LSE) Ss, and (b) that when Ss did not have any
feedback on thei r performance, HSE Ss performed somewhat
better than did LSE Ss (.06 level of significance, one
tailed test), and Korman concluded that

11 •

•

•

not having

knowledge of results during performance does seem to be an
impediment."

(Korman, 1970, p.39).

Although both these

experiments from Korman's (1970) study would have conformed
to a simple 2 X 2 analysis of variance design, Korman made
the simple hypothesis that HSE Ss would perform better
than LSE Ss, then performed a t-test between HSE and LSE
groups.
There was one deviation from the procedure of Kor
man's (1970) study that should be reported.

The portion of

the present study called "replication" was not, strictly
speaking, an exact reproduction of Korman's (1970) study.
19
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There is a major difference in the methodology employed
to manipulate the delay df feedback varia ble.

In the

Korman (1970) study, a sort of "intrinsic" feedback was
given to the Ss.

To give feedback, Korman used the Brick

Uses test as a dependen t variable, and- S knew how many
answers he was making as he went along.
11

no feedback" manipulation was

!'TB

Conversely, the

de when the Inferences

Subtest of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal
was used as a dependent variable and the S could not know
whether his answers were co rrect or incorrect.

The meth

oaology used in the present experiment was, if anything,
more definite and explicit than Korman's.

Since the correct

answers were given to Ss on a slip of paper, feedback
could be given on the Watson-Gla ser test, the Brick Uses
test, or the Match Problems test.

In this manner, even

levels (or frequen cy) of feedback could be manipulated.
Although Korman's (1970) method of giving feedback wa� not
used, the procedure used in this study does not appear to
be radically different o

Aside from this alteration of the

feedback variable, the variables self -esteem and self-per
cei ved competence were kept as similar to Korman's (1970)
procedure as possible.
All results should be viewed with the limitation
imposed by use of a small Nin mind.

Although the n per

cell was sma 11, particul arly in the 3 X 2 X 2 desig n, the

F values are so low that even the use of a far less criti

21

cal criterion for significance (e.g., alpha=.20) results in
the same failure to find a significant difference.
Close attention should be given to the validity of
the independe.nt variable

11

self-esteem. 11

Unfortunately, no

simple procedure exists for validating the self-assurance
scale of Ghiselli's Self-Description Inventory.

Ghiselli

(1971, p. 59) investigated validation by having twenty-one
personnel officers rate themselves in terms of individual
job effectiveness on a fifteen-step rating scale.

He

then correlated those ratings with the scores from the self
a�surance scale and found a correlation of 0.37 between
the scale scores and the self-ratings.

Ghiselli also

examined the life-histories of fourteen managerial�type
men.

Their general effectiveness in dealing with personal

and occupational problems was rated and the ratings and
their scores on the self-assurance scales were correlated.
The correlation was 0.66, a significant value.

In the

present study it appears that the Ss either lacked much
self-assurance in general, or the self-assurance scale is
not valid for the college Ss used.

The highest scale

score obtained in the present study was thirty, which
corresponds to only the fifty-sixth percentile of Ghiselli's
norm group.

Ghiselli I s norm group was c_o mposed of 346

persons, some college students and some employed persons.

The average self-assurance score in the present study was
22.39, with a standard deviation of J.635.

22

Ghiselli gave

no average or standard deviation for his norm group.
Ghiselli did, however, compute these statistics for three
groups of persons:
top managers.

1 ne managers, middle managers, and

Even the closest population mean, that of

line managers, was significantly different from the college
student population used in the present stady.

See Table V

for a comparison of these statistics. When used as an
instrument for measuring the self-esteem of college stu
dents, one can only guess at the sensitivity and accuracy
of Ghiselli's self-assur�nce scale.·
It was stated earlier that differences in Ss 1 self
perceived competence failed to show a statistically signifi
cant effect on the performance of the Ss used in th�s study.
One explanation for this result is provided by Stedry and
Kay (1966).

They found that when difficult goals were per

ceived as challenging, performance improved.

These inves

tigators were careful to point out, however, that it is
difficult to distinguish between that which is challenging
and that which is impossible.

The non-significant results

in the present study can be explained either by the hy
pothesis that there simply was no effect due to the self
perceived competence manipulation, or that the task ap
peared too impossible for the Ss, and they were not up to

TABLE V
Di ffer ences Betwe en College Student Population
and Various Manageria l Populations on
Ghis elli's Self-Assurance Scale
Groups
College Student s
Lin e Management
Middle Management
Top Management

X

s.do

22.4

3.635

24.9

4.5
5.3

26.7

28.6

5.1

{:·p<. 05
'.H�p<.001

23

t

n

31

172
176
113

4 • 34,n,
J' .,
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such a challenge.

It is interesting to note that the

effectiveness of this particular varia ble was al so of
concern to Korman (1968) in one o f his earlier studies
involving self-perceived co mpetence.

In that study,

Korman asked each S to write a r,eragraph concerning his
reaction to the experimental situation.
responded th at they
the study;

1

1

Vir tually all Ss

believed 11 the normativ e purpose of

yet there is a missing link between "believing"

an experimenter and attributing the effects to the inde
pendent variable.

In this day and age of over-tested,

sophisticated student subjects, the more probable response
is ''Yes, I believe the experimen ter wants t o compare us
to Harvard (or community college) studmts.
It's Friday and it's hot.

So who cares?

Maybe if we follow directions

quickly we'll get out early."

The hypothesis that the

dif ferent levels of sel f-perceived competence simply had
no significant efrect on Ss' performance would appear to
remain the more plausible one.
From a theoretical standpoint, Korman's (1970) pre
dictions are open to question.

When feedback was given

to both HSE and LSE groups and when both high- and low
self-perceived competence was experimentally induced fo r
HSE and LSE groups. Korman made the simple prediction that
the HSE group would perform better than the LSE group.
Jacobs and Maas (1969) have co ncluded that HSE Ss may
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maintain their self-image by refusing to accept informa
tion that would seemingly impa:ir
.
thei r abilities.

On the

other hand, presenta tion of inf or ation to LSE Ss that
would make one look more able is easier to incorporate.
This conclusion would lead one to more elaborate predic
tions than Korman made.

Tbe Jacobs and Maas hypothe sis

would predict that, given either exper imentally induced
low self-perceived competence or feedback which disagrees
with S's responses, the HSE Ss would approximately main
tain their performance, while LSE Ss 1 performance would
probably experience a relatively greater adverse effect.
Similarly, if the feedback agrees with an S's responses,
or when high self-perceived co mpetence is induced, HSE Ss'
performance will remain about the same, whereas that of the
LSE Ss would be improved.

In general, Jacobs and Maas

(1969) would predict that HSE persons will more or less
maintain their perforrmnce under all kinds of situati ons,
while LSE people are more likely to be influenced by the
circumstances around them.

The predietion by Korman (1970)

that HSE Ss wi ll perform better than LSE

Ss, with or with

out feedback, with high- or low self-perceived competence,
could well be so mething of an oversimplification.

SUGGESTIONS FC R F UTURE RESEARCH

The general topic of self-esteem as a motivational
hypothesis is only beginning to be explored.

Any attempt

to list all possible areas of future research would be
virtually endless.

The results of t:ie present study do,

h owever, sugg est several specific research ar e a s .
Perhaps one of the most important areas for research
is that of developing a valid and reliable instrument for
measuring s e lf- es t e e m.

At the very least, validation of

Gh i sell i's self-as s uranc e scale for strictly student pop ulations needs to be und e rtaken .

Development of new vali-

dation procedures might also assist in attaining an accurate measure of s e l f - es t e e m.

Research should not, of

cou r se , be confined to Gh i s el l i's scale;

it may or may

not be the ultimate answer to the dependent variable
dil erima.
AnothP.r research area exists for tl:-'~e independent
variable self-p erceived co"Tipeten~e.

The procedure used

initiBlly by Korman (1968) and adopted in the present study
may not be either credible or stringent enoug h .

Other

i•"Jagimitive manifestations of the self-perceived competence
variable need to be deve l oped.
Research areas on the topic of self-est e em can be
found not only for independent and dependent variables,
but on the theory itself as well.
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As discussed previously
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in the present study, Jaco bs and Maas (1969) would make
theoretical predictions different from those of Korman o
Korman operates on an "absolute dif ference" hypothesis
between HSE and LSE groups, whereas Jacobs and Maas (1969)
base t heir predictions on a "relative ch�nge 11 hypothesis.
An experiment designed to test these two competing
hypotheses could easily be performed.
The results shown in Table Vindicating the mean
self-esteem scores of various groups suggest a final
possibility for research.

It is possible that self-esteem

changes with experience and age.

Either some type of

longitudinal study measuring self-esteem at various points
in time could be per for med or perhaps a partial correla
tion study a nalyzing the relati onship between age and
self-esteem scores with age held constant could be de
signed.

It

wi 11

be re.called that su ch a design was

proposed in the present st udy for self-esteem and "intel
ligence."

Self-esteem may vary predictably not only as a

function of age or intelligence, but perhaps also as a
function of income , grade point average or any or a myriad
of variables.
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